

Transregional Responses to Displacement: Aid, Advocacy and Accountability

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Introduction

By the end of 2024 – when the Assad regime was overthrown -, over 6.2 million refugees from Syria were estimated to have fled the country, the majority seeking refuge in Türkiye (c. 2.8 million), Lebanon (c. 1 million) and Jordan (564,000). By early-2025, there continued to be c. 7.2 million internally displaced people (IDPs) within Syria. From 2011 onwards - as (now deposed) Syrian regime responded with both widespread and targeted violence to a major challenge to its authority by protestors and eventually armed groups in 2011- a wide range of emergency aid programmes were implemented to assist these internationally and internally displaced people. These were developed both by UN agencies and donor states from the global North, and by diverse actors from the so-called ‘global South.’ In addition to initiatives led by refugees and civil society networks (which I have explored in greater detail elsewhereⁱ), policies and assistance programmes for refugees from Syria were developed and implemented by the host states of Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye, as well as by a range of regional bodies, states and non-governmental organisations from around the world.

While extensive attention has been given to *regional* responders, especially the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council,ⁱⁱ there has been much less attention to responses developed and implemented on a *transregional* level.ⁱⁱⁱ This report draws on the SOURCED research project (see Box 1) to posit the importance of paying greater attention to past, present and future *transregional* responses to conflict and displacement as developed by states and organisations with varying degrees of income and of relative geopolitical power. To do so, the report focuses on responses developed to date by state and non-state actors from (in alphabetical order) Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, South Korea and Malaysia, noting that these initiatives reflect long histories of transregional support which include, but also transcend, financial or material donations.

As explored in the following pages, such responses encompass long-standing initiatives based on principles and practices of cooperation, solidarity and mutual aid; a commitment to protecting international legal principles and processes; and providing both formal and informal opportunities for resettlement as well as transnational educational and employment programmes for people with displacement backgrounds to seek a combination of individual, collective and national forms of self-sufficiency. While focusing primarily on responses to displacement from Syria as implemented in Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye, this discussion is situated in the context of broader historical and contemporary responses to conflict and displacement situations across the Middle East, including in relation to the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

As I have argued elsewhere,^{iv} this work is particularly urgent at a time when states across the global North have been cutting foreign and humanitarian aid, as well as attacking and seeking to dismantle both national and UN humanitarian and development agencies, thereby forcing humanitarian actors to rethink how aid is delivered and by whom. In such a context, it is particularly important to consider the history, present and potential future of thus-far under-researched transregional initiatives. In this sense, the diversification of ‘responders’ not only already exists, but also points to the potential for complementary forms of response

which go beyond funding the provision of assistance and services, and more intently focus on the protection needs of people affected by displacement.

Box 1: Southern Responses to Displacement: Views from Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye

Between 2017-2025, the SOURCED research project has been examining the roles that states from the so-called global South on the one hand, and non-state actors including civil society networks and refugees themselves on the other, have been playing in responding to conflict and displacement from Syria. To do so, the team has conducted more than 400 interviews – speaking with over 150 people displaced from Syria and 150 long-term residents of the localities where displaced people live (including people who themselves have personal or familial experiences of displacement, also known as ‘refugee hosts’), as well as over 70 representatives of local and national CBOs/NGOs and over 40 representatives of INGOs and UN bodies - in addition to conducting ethnographic research in, and running a series of participatory and creative writing workshops with the residents of Baddawi camp, Jebel al-Baddawi, Akkar and Beirut in Lebanon; Irbid, Azraq and Amman in Jordan; and Istanbul, Gaziantep and Hatay in Türkiye.

Through a multiscalar and multi-perspectival approach, the research has thus sought to:

- Examine who/what has been responding to the needs and rights of displaced people, identifying and examining the roles that states (variously labelled as ‘non-traditional’, ‘Southern’ and/or ‘postcolonial’) and non-state actors (including civil society networks and refugees themselves) have been playing in responding to conflict and displacement;
- Explore how and why such responses have been developed and implemented by these people, groups, organisations and states, to better understand the models and principles of local and ‘Southern’ responses; and,
- Centralise how refugees themselves experience, conceptualise and variously accept or reject both ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ responses to displacement.

A longer analysis of the project’s findings has examined different meanings and critiques of the notion of ‘Southern responses’ and has mapped and explored refugees’ experiences, conceptualisations and critiques of multiscalar responses to displacement, ranging from individual and community-based refugee-led initiatives to multimillion dollar responses funded by high-income states from the Middle East and the Gulf.^v

Mapping Past, Present and Future Responses to Displacement

Throughout the SOURCED research project, refugees from Syria repeatedly referred to the aid they had received from local, regional and transregional actors both when they were inside and outside of Syria. Prior to being displaced to Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye, internally displaced people received support from a wide range of individuals, groups and states. They indicated that such responses began with forms of mutual support from other people within Syria, through what is well-documented as instances of individuals and community-members being ‘first responders’ to conflict and displacement:

At the beginning of the battles, we took refuge from our area to the city of Homs. We were embraced by its residents who provided us with housing, food and drink. The aid was individual initiatives, at that time no activity was recorded by international associations or institutions - Syrian refugee from Qusayr living in Akkar (Lebanon)

As time passed, a wider variety of responders started providing support within Syria, including “Southern service providers” as outlined by a Syrian from the Homs countryside living in Baddawi camp:

I got help from refugees and displaced people, even Southern service providers. Aid recorded great activity in the period that accompanied the beginning of the events in Syria. Refugees looked at each other with sympathy and were sharing their belongings and money in difficult circumstances. The newly established groups also played a key role in providing funds and basic needs to all needy people in Homs Governorate.

In turn, two Syrian refugees interviewed in Türkiye recalled the support they received whilst still internally displaced within Syria:

When shelling accelerated in Idlib city I moved to my home village. In 2015, I left Idlib, [and] we received aid as it was distributed to everybody from many organizations from Malaysia, Indonesia and the Gulf countries.

and

We received aid as it was distributed to everybody from organizations from Malaysia, Indonesia and the Arabic Gulf countries. NGOs reached out for all displaced people.

Such a diversity of responses – by residents of the areas where people sought refuge, by other displaced people, as well as international responders from within and beyond the region – further expanded after crossing the border to neighbouring countries. Regional and transregional actors alike provided direct assistance to refugees; channelled resources directly to ‘host’ governments, and/or to NGOs who delivered the aid on their behalf; and/or provided support to community-based groups (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2025).

In many such instances, it was people with refugee backgrounds who were delivering such aid and providing such services, as in the case of a Syrian from Damascus who was working in an NGO in Türkiye at the time of the interview, who reported that “we have a lot of Arab donors mainly from the Gulf and we also have three Malaysian donors.” Reflecting on the *modus operandi* of such donors, they continued by explaining is that

The nice thing about them is that they don’t interfere in our work like the Northern donors do which gives us freedom to make decisions related to the services we provide. They are more flexible, and they don’t restrict us only to their vision. It makes the projects with them more comfortable and flexible. The Northerners interfere a lot and impose many restrictions.

In turn, a Palestinian long-term resident of Baddawi camp in Lebanon noted that, although “the largest contributors to relief operations are Gulf organizations [...], countries like Malaysia or Indonesia are undoubtedly key supporters of many local organizations that have never shied away from providing services to refugees from Syria.”

The same states and organisations were thus often mentioned by interviews, notably not only the Gulf states and charitable organisations which have received extensive academic and policy attention to date, but also the relatively less well-researched countries of Malaysia and Indonesia.

The precise constellation of direct and indirect encounters with such actors varied significantly across the locations where the SOURCED project conducted research, both on a country-by-country basis, depending

on people's place of residence within those countries, and the point in time when they had arrived in that location. This variation, as well as deep engagement with refugees' critiques of diverse groups of aid providers, is explored in greater detail elsewhere,^{vi} including as it pertains to the relative invisibility or hypervisibility of regional and transregional actors in different contexts. For the purposes of this report, I draw on the research findings to home in on a series of Spotlights on transregional responses which both include but also go beyond material and financial assistance for refugees within the Middle East.

The importance of recognising different configurations of both regional and transregional assistance for refugees was posited by the representative of a newly established initiative in Baddawi refugee camp who argued that:

Countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Cuba cannot be addressed from one angle, as each of them has its own way of providing assistance to refugees in this country. For example, Malaysians and Indonesians have always contributed to local charities, nursing homes, rehabilitation centers for people with special needs and orphans, while Maghreb aid is predominantly immediate and circumstantial. Perhaps the same applies to Saudi Arabia.

While Malaysia was referenced in passing in these and other interviews cited above and below, it is notable that for many interlocutors, there were many questions about the actual roles that these states played, and, indeed, a broader lack of knowledge about the past and present work that these and other states have been undertaking in refugee response. For instance, a representative of an organisation for young people in Baddawi camp indicated that:

Morocco sent humanitarian and medical aid to Lebanon about a week ago. I have never before heard of them taking similar steps in favour of Syrian refugees or others. I also don't know much about what Malaysia is doing in this country.

The fact that some actors have a long-standing presence and role in responding to displacement in Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye and yet they are not recognised as such more broadly, is itself a significant finding of the SOURCED project, including as it pertains to evolving debates relating to the need to diversify donors and providers of aid in light of the aid cuts.

Indeed, it is worth reflecting on the words of a Palestinian refugee in Northern Lebanon, who regretted the relative lack of knowledge with regards to the historic and ongoing forms of support offered by these two countries:

There is an unintentional disregard for the great service role played by Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia towards refugees in this region. It is not only related to the local community members' lack of knowledge about the various programs and humanitarian contributions in their areas: we can also add the absence of the media machine from these countries and their failure to use the aid they provide in any self-promoting or utilitarian framework, despite the availability of resources and the means to do so. But it is a unique moral school that necessitated its Malaysian and Indonesian affiliates to practice their humanitarian work in the shadows and away from cameras.

Whilst he applauded the "unique moral school" that led Malaysia and Indonesia to practice what I have elsewhere denominated (with regards to refugees' discretion when responding to the needs of other displaced people) the "poetics of undisclosed care,"^{vii} this lack of "knowledge" or awareness of the roles that such states have been playing in the region for decades, may have significant implications if such states start playing a more expansive role in light of the funding cuts and politically produced precarity resulting,

among other things, from the US Administration's defunding of USAID. In effect, when attempting to diversify the funding and operational landscape (i.e. to 'fill the funding gap'), there may be an equally important need to 'fill the knowledge gap' in order, in turn, to 'fill the trust gap.'

On the one hand, many of the people who contributed to the SOURCED research project were aware of these states' historical roles: in addition to the above-cited Syrians and Palestinians, a Lebanese aid provider noted that "Among the countries that I feel are dealing [with the Syrian refugee situation] with humanity are Japan, Germany, Malaysia, Indonesia and Qatar", and a second Lebanese individual shared their opinion that "in Lebanon we have more feelings of acceptance and collaboration between countries like Venezuela, Brazil or Indonesia and Cuba rather than the UK, the US, etc."

On the other hand, however, the "lack of knowledge" about responses by countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia was demonstrated in numerous interviews across Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye alike. A Syrian woman living in Baddawi camp lamented that "I feel ashamed when I say that Islamic and Arab organizations are not doing their real duty towards the refugees. Morocco and Malaysia are countries that no one knows, and two names are not used at all. Here you can say Saudi Arabia, Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain. These are the ones who bear the full responsibility," while an aid practitioner working in Amman queried who/what was actually providing assistance:

For me it's more about understanding if one is coming on an individual basis or it's more of a country level.... You mentioned Morocco in Jordan... I mean, is Morocco assisting, and coming to Jordan, or are they just individuals? Because I haven't heard that Malaysia and Morocco come as donors for Syrians.

Together, these insights and the broader findings from the research project reflect different approaches across Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye, reminding us not only of the country-specific nature of aid landscapes (i.e. recognising that certain actors are 'actually' more or less present in a specific country), but also that the presence or absence of such actors may be known and/or evaluated differently depending on a wide range of factors. As a partial contribution to filling these gaps in knowledge, the rest of this report maps the roles played by a range of state and non-state actors through a series of Spotlights. Together, these Spotlights highlight a plurality of approaches to responding to conflict and displacement, including transregional processes of material aid and service provision as well as sharing technical knowledge and supporting locally-based refugee-led organisations; transregional pathways to asylum, protection and educational migration; and transregional initiatives to uphold international law and principles of protection.

Transregional Aid and Collaboration: Spotlight on Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

The first Spotlight briefly draws attention to how organisations from Japan as well as South Korea and Taiwan emerged in the research as responding to support refugees from Syria on the one hand, as well as people affected by earthquakes in Türkiye on the other. These examples revolve around the provision of material and programmatic aid, as well as support for local, community-led organisations, and sharing expertise and knowledge with regards to disaster management.

Reflecting on the humanitarian support provided by different actors across the country, a UNDP practitioner drew attention to the roles of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in both refugee response and in disaster management, summarising his perspective that "Japanese and South Korea are also quite active. And Taiwan was also very active during the earthquake response." Japan in particular was frequently mentioned as a significant contributor to refugee response, with interviewees tracing Japanese actors' involvement in Türkiye to the 2011 Van earthquake. With regards to supporting refugees from Syria, a

Syrian humanitarian worker originally from Idlib now living in Türkiye noted that “countries from the Gulf or Africa or even Japan have all allocated certain responses to Syrian refugees. There are three Japanese initiatives here in Türkiye” and a Turkish citizen from Ankara acknowledged “Of course, Qatar has close relations with Türkiye. But there is support from other Southern countries, Japan and other countries as well.”

Beyond general references to state-led responses, Japanese NGOs like AAR Japan (the Association for Air and Relief, Japan, founded in 1979) were identified by interviewees as providing refugees from Syria with in-kind and financial aid as well as key services tailored to individual needs in areas of the country like Esenyurt District of Istanbul and Urfa near the Turkish-Syrian border. Throughout the research, Japanese NGOs were noted for their professionalism, small expert teams, and collaboration with local and Syrian-led NGOs. Although their visibility was sometimes limited compared to Western donors like Germany or the UN,^{viii} Syrian refugees working in locally-based NGOs in Türkiye were aware of AAR Japan’s presence, although they were unclear about the precise nature of services provided:

I heard about a Japanese organization called AAR Japan, which provides its services in Southern Türkiye, but I do not know what these services are. – Syrian from Duma working for an NGO in Türkiye

I hear about a Japanese organization based in Urfa, called ARR Japan, and I know about the Qatari Crescent and Qatar Charity. – Syrian from Aleppo working for an NGO in Türkiye

In turn, South Korean organisations were also recognized for their substantial contributions during disaster situations, particularly the earthquake response in Türkiye. Korean aid was identified as offering comprehensive support—education, health, and infrastructure—often in partnership with local actors. In Jordan, Korean NGOs helped establish tents in the Za’atari camp, leading to areas of the camp being named “Korean villages.” Elsewhere in Jordan, a Syrian from Daraa living in Jerash noted that “There was collaboration between Korean doctors and the Red Crescent in Jerash. I can’t remember more because since the last two years many providers left Jerash and the activities by the providers disappeared.” While this and other initiatives had disappeared or decreased over time (see below),^{ix} a Jordan-based INGO worker reflected that “the Korean KOICA [Korea International Cooperation Agency] and Japan’s JICA [Japan International Cooperation Agency] have become a lot more active in the displacement context. They didn’t used to be very big donors before,” suggesting an increase in financial contributions.

Within the context of this internally diverse aid landscape, many interlocutors emphasised the collaborative and flexible nature of working with organisations for Japan and Korea (echoing the sentiments of interlocutors who spoke of Malaysian donors in a similar way, cited above). Nonetheless, a small number of individuals reflected on the ways that religious and cultural differences have occasionally hindered collaboration. For instance, a Syrian aid provider originally from Aleppo now based in Türkiye explained that they “haven’t worked with ... Asian organizations”, in part due to what was identified as a “difference” in religious perspectives:

Once, a Korean organization reached out to us, but we refused to work with them because of a big difference in their religious aims and consequently religious impact.

In contrast, although Taiwan’s role was less frequently mentioned as a whole, the support offered by a Taiwanese organisation was portrayed positively by a Syrian aid provider from Aleppo working in Türkiye, based on a religious and cultural alignment: “It plays a big role. This Taiwan organization is Muslim, all the workers are Muslim, and the school principal is a very respected religious man who helps refugees in need.” This appeared to provide foundations to establish and build trust with members of local communities.

This brief Spotlight thus demonstrates a variety of transregional approaches by state and non-state actors from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, including both the provision of aid and services on the one hand, and supporting locally-run groups and organisations in Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye on the other.

Transregional Pathways to Asylum and Protection: Spotlight on Brazil and Cuba

To these, we must also add transregional modes of assistance which prioritise pathways to asylum and protection outside of refugees' region of origin. In this regard, some state-led transregional responses for refugees in the Middle East are relatively well-known and have received not-insignificant academic and policy attention, while others have long histories but have received less attention to date.

An example of the former is the Brazilian state's responses to the Syrian conflict and in support of displaced people in and from Syria.^x From 2012 onwards, Brazil's support primarily consisted in providing food items for refugees from Syria through the UN, offering financial support for Syrian refugee children through UNICEF, and funding emergency medical kits through WHO.^{xi} This provision of support *in* the Middle East was also soon supplemented by a transregional solidarity resettlement programme for refugees displaced from Syria to Brazil.

Between 2007 and 2017, 2,771 Syrian nationals arrived in Brazil as humanitarian visa holders who could then apply for refugee status upon arrival in Brazil, with Syrians gradually coming to represent the largest percentage of refugees in the country.^{xii} Over the last decade, Brazil's introduction of humanitarian visas has thus represented what Carpi and I have identified as "an alternative politics of care to the provision of aid to refugees in the war-affected region of the Middle East."^{xiii} Unlike Palestinians' exclusion from many resettlement schemes worldwide, the humanitarian visa for individuals affected by the Syrian conflict has also extended to Palestinians from Syria. Of the ten Syrian nationals who intended to resettle in Brazil and who participated in this phase of the SOURCED research project,^{xiv} most people explained that Brazil was their first choice of resettlement; only a small minority declared that Brazil was their second choice, on the basis that they had been rejected by other embassies or they had failed in their family reunification attempts in e.g. Malaysia, Australia and Canada.

Although most resettlement schemes only allow applications from people who have already secured refugee status in a country of first asylum, most of the people who approached the Brazilian consulate in Beirut to apply for resettlement were still living inside Syria at the time, ranging from those who faced multiple internal displacements that cyclically jeopardised their livelihoods and housing conditions within Syria, to those who had never been displaced and whose belongings had neither been destroyed nor confiscated. Three out of these ten people were living in Lebanon; none of them were registered with UNHCR and they did not report any personal experience of having received emergency relief provision. The main reasons for seeking a humanitarian visa to Brazil instead of remaining in either Syria or Lebanon were concerns for their personal and family safety, the desire to work in their own field of expertise, or to secure legal and financial sustainability, which they identified as being unachievable in the region and further endangering their dignified social status.^{xv}

Such transregional initiatives build on, and can be understood via, the long history of migration from the broader Middle East to - and the resulting significant Syrian and Palestinian diaspora across - the countries of South America and the Caribbean.^{xvi} Indeed, as a Brazilian consular representative in Beirut shared during his interview in Lebanon:

[Since 2010, Brazil is] leading the marine task force in UNIFIL [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon]. We are here with the ship [in Lebanon]. We are a hundred Brazilian marines serving there.

Every two months a ship goes back to Brazil, and a new one comes. It's a rotation system. Do you know that Brazil is home to more Lebanese people than Lebanon itself? Around half million, so it is a strong component there.

The combination of providing material assistance for refugees in situ (Brazil funding aid in the Middle East), developing a *transregional* resettlement programme (the humanitarian visa scheme for Syrian refugees to settle in Brazil) as well as the Brazilian state's contribution to the peace-keeping force established in 1978 in Southern Lebanon (Brazilian marines working in Lebanon), thus highlights Brazil's multifaceted contributions to responses to conflict and displacement in Lebanon and Brazil alike.

In turn, Cuba's responses to conflict and displacement are long-standing and yet relatively under-explored. While not offering access to asylum or being envisioned as a 'resettlement' programme *per se*, Cuba's transnational educational migration programme has, since the 1970s, offered secondary and tertiary level education to refugee youth including Palestinian, Sahrawi, Namibian and South Sudanese refugees.^{xvii} The case of Cuba's medical and educational internationalism, designed to develop *communal* and *national* (as opposed to solely *individual*) forms of 'self-sufficiency,' is one example of transnational programmes going beyond 'emergency' response from the onset of a 'crisis.'^{xviii} Even if the specific case of Cuba was rarely mentioned as part of this research project, such an *approach* – providing opportunities for professional development through educational and work programmes outside of the country of origin or of first asylum – was highly valued by many interlocutors, refugees and humanitarian practitioners alike both in the context of this project and in my research more widely.^{xix} In the context of the SOURCED project, a Palestinian representative of an organisation for young people in Baddawi camp shared his opinion that providing opportunities for educational and labour migration, rather than limiting assistance to "in-kind materials and necessary supplies to refugees...is the best way to provide assistance to the afflicted peoples", explaining that:

For many years, the countries of the South have provided refugees with valuable assistance. This aid was not exclusive to Syrians, as it also included Palestinian refugees and displaced Lebanese. We have never forgotten the role played by countries such as Libya, Kuwait and Cuba in strengthening the resilience of Palestinian refugees in particular from 1970 to 1990. This assistance was not limited to providing in-kind materials and necessary supplies to refugees inside the Palestinian camps, but also included study grants and work contracts in the above-mentioned countries. It is true that this was in the past, but in my opinion, it is the best way to provide assistance to the afflicted peoples.

The juxtaposition between the material assistance and opportunities to study and work in oil-rich states like Libya and Kuwait on the one hand, and the educational migration programmes provided by a country like Cuba which has been subject to an embargo since 1962, marks the diversity of responses that have been, and can be provided in support of refugees through both regional and transregional initiatives.

Although this example was framed as a *historical* example ("this was in the past"), the Cuban scholarship programme has important legacies that reverberate to date. This is demonstrated by the fact that many Syrian and Palestinian students who trained in Cuba to become doctors and surgeons between 1970s-2000s have been providing medical assistance to people displaced within and from Syria, including Syrians, Palestinians, Kurds and Iraqis.^{xx} Indeed, Palestinians and Syrians educated in Cuba are amongst the medical practitioners who have been treating refugees and IDPs in Syria, across Lebanon and also in Gaza (see below). With reference to the latter, for instance, Dr Fayez Abed, who graduated from Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine in 2020^{xxi} as one of the circa 1,500 Palestinians who studied in Cuba between 1974-2024, has been providing care for other Palestinians displaced, wounded and killed in Gaza.^{xxii}

Upholding International Law and Principles of Protection: Spotlight on South Africa and The Hague Group

It is clear that from the perspective of the Syrian and Palestinian refugees who participated in this part of the research project that people who have been displaced prioritise the development of policies and practices that enhance “security and safety”, including through providing opportunities for asylum and resettlement (as outlined above in the context of Brazil), and working on “the advocacy level and political level” to find political solutions to what are inherently politically-produced vulnerabilities.^{xxiii}

Indeed, people repeatedly stressed that even more than material and financial aid, what refugees “need is security and safety”, as a Syrian from Al-Qusayr (Homs) identified; they continued that this can be achieved by “facilitat[ing] laws and [allowing Syrian refugees to] choose a place of residence and asylum in any country.” Syrians’ and Palestinians’ wide-spread insistence that asylum and resettlement are essential routes to “security and safety” was accompanied by highlighting the potential for major protection gaps to be filled by offering “the most important assistance” on the “advocacy level and political level”, as maintained by a Palestinian woman born in Jordan.

Implicit within such an approach is both the recognition that political and legal responses should be prioritised – as is the core mandate of international institutions and agencies such as the UN –, whilst recognising that there is, and should be, a division of labour across different actors: some providing material assistance, some delivering services, others engaging in advocacy and holding states and organisations to account, and others developing and implementing legal and political systems that protect people’s rights writ large. In the words of a Jordanian individual, “Launching political initiatives seeking a ceasefire in Syria and promoting civil peace was far more worthy than launching aid programs here or there,” with a second Jordanian citizen going further to suggest that “Southern countries should cut all ties with [Northern states] and work seriously in stopping wars and displacement in our countries.”

In this regard, the SOURCED research project highlights the significance of both the *quality*, and not just the *quantity*, of response, and, equally, the importance of recognising the existence of ‘unquantifiable’ forms of response and ‘non-traditional modes of response’ that go beyond financial support and the roles of donor/host states.

Here, responses to the ongoing genocide in Gaza demonstrate a form of state-led response whose effects are, in the words of a workshop participant, “immeasurable” and “unquantifiable.”^{xxiv} In effect, at the same time as some countries from across the global Northern have been cutting foreign and humanitarian aid, as well as attacking and seeking to dismantle both national and UN humanitarian and development agencies, other states have responded to the ongoing genocide in Gaza by seeking to hold hegemonic states and institutions accountable for committing and/or being complicit in the most serious of crimes under international law. Around the world, politicians, academics, directors of international, national and local human rights organisations, as well as civil society networks, have highlighted the underlying hypocrisy and violence of a ‘rules-based’ order founded and led by Western states which perpetuates colonial systems of oppression and exploitation and systematically fails to uphold the rights of peoples affected by occupation, conflict, mass displacement and dispossession. In this context, states from across the so-called global South have been highly visible and audible on a global stage in leading international responses to uphold the rights of displaced Palestinians.^{xxv}

Most notably, in December 2023, the South African government – a country that fought for and won its own freedom from apartheid and colonial occupation – brought a ground-breaking genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), seeking and being granted provisional measures to uphold “the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide.” Building on a long-standing official tradition of support and solidarity between states that identify themselves or are identified

by others as members of the global South, BRICS, and/or the Non-Aligned Movement,^{xxvi} South Africa has been supported in its legal case against Israel before the ICJ by countries which are often conceptualised as ‘Southern’ and ‘postcolonial’ states, including Nicaragua, Colombia, Türkiye, Libya, Egypt, Maldives, Mexico, Chile and Cuba.

From the end of 2023 onwards, states from around the world have thus been recognized as diplomatic leaders at the UN and elsewhere, with South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Comoros, and Djibouti referring the situation of Palestine to the ICC in November 2023, and numerous states subsequently seeking a permanent ceasefire and compliance with the ICJ’s Interim Orders throughout 2024. For instance, resolutions were drafted (inter alia) by Algeria, Ecuador, Guyana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Republic of Korea and Sierra Leone in March 2024; Namibia submitted interventions in relation to the South African case brought before the ICJ; and resolutions were passed by the Non-Aligned Movement, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League.

By the end of January 2025, when over 50,000 Palestinians in Gaza were estimated to have been killed by the Israeli army and Gaza’s entire population of c. 2 million people had been displaced on multiple occasions, such momentum has led to the inauguration of The Hague Group, founded by the governments of Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Malaysia, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa. In their inaugural statement, these states asserted that they had come together “in the solemn commitment to an international order based on the rule of law and international law” alongside “the principles of justice,” to uphold UN resolutions and the rulings of the ICJ and the arrest warrants issued by the ICC. In so doing, these and other states have demonstrated the ways that transregional cooperation and collaboration can be mobilised to uphold international humanitarian law and to hold other states and non-state actors accountable in the process of protecting the rights of people subjected to conflict and displacement.

While some of the states supporting South Africa’s case before the ICJ case and which have founded The Hague Group have long been recognised as ‘hosting’ refugees, most of the states involved in these recent diplomatic initiatives have rarely been categorised as ‘donor states.’ Their responses, however, demonstrate the multiple roles that states with varying levels of GDP and relative geopolitical power can play, including through collaboration on cross-cutting transnational *principles* rather than based on geographical proximity or regional blocs.

Intersecting Responses to Conflict and Displacement in and from Syria, Lebanon and Gaza: Spotlights on Malaysian and Indonesian responses

The roles that Malaysia and Indonesia are playing in Gaza -including their historic roles in service provision and international diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire and uphold international law - means that these states’ responses to conflict and displacement are receiving more international attention, and yet their long-standing initiatives have remained largely marginalized both in academic studies and in popular knowledge, as noted in the opening part of this report. To partially fill such gaps in knowledge, the first part of this Spotlight offers a focused summary of Malaysian-led responses developed in support of Syrian refugees in Lebanon since 2011 and for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Gaza since the late-1980s. This historical background helps situate the Malaysian state’s ongoing support for Palestinians’ rights in Gaza, including through its role in The Hague Group. The second part of the Spotlight subsequently focuses on the role played by Indonesia both in Gaza and in Lebanon, while the quotations offered in the opening part of this report indicate the extent to which Malaysia and Indonesia are, in many ways, intersecting with one another (and other state and non-state actors) in their responses to displacement, rather than operating in isolation from one another.

Malaysian responses to conflict and displacement in and from Syria, Lebanon and Gaza

Malaysia – both through direct support provided by the state and through state-supported NGOs – has offered a wide range of initiatives for refugees in, and from, the Middle East. In Baddawi camp, the Beit Atfal Assumoud Community Centre has been providing support to Syrian refugees and Palestinians from Syria since 2011, and to Palestinian residents since the mid-1970s. As noted by a Palestinian aid provider who works there, Beit Atfal Assumoud receives transregional support, including not only from Europe but also from three states from across Asia:

We, as a Palestinian institution, receive support from many parties. We depend on the Europeans to finance our projects, just as we depend on other countries such as Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia.

More specifically, in the 1990s, the Malaysian Sociological Research Institute (MSRI) and the Malaysian Government funded the establishment of the Malaysian Gifted Learning Center within Beit Atfal Assumoud, and since then it has been providing educational, financial, social, cultural, and medical assistance to its sponsored families in the camp. As another person based in the camp asserted,

The Malaysian role is evident in receiving Palestinian missions and in providing assistance to some Palestinian institutions supporting orphans [such as Beit Atfal Assumoud] in Lebanon. In Malaysia itself, sponsors are active, taking it upon themselves to pay school and university fees for a specific category of refugee students.

Indeed, Malaysia's support for refugees from Syria must be viewed in relation to its long history of supporting Palestinian refugees, not least because refugees from Syria in Lebanon have been receiving assistance from Malaysia in spaces and through programmes historically developed for Palestinians in Lebanon.

Notably, despite its historical association with Malaysia, more recent arrivals in the camp, including refugees from Syria, are not necessarily aware of this institutional and funding history, with a Palestinian displaced from Yarmouk camp referring to "some of the associations that the Northerners fund, such as the Beit Atfal Assumoud." In effect, according to a Syrian refugee from Eastern Ghouta, "most Southern organizations have closed their doors [in the camp]. As for the Northern organizations are continuing. For example, most of the aid of Beit Atfal Assamoud bears the UNDP logo." With the hypervisibility of UNDP leading to its association with 'Northern organisations,' Malaysia's current and historical role in supporting Beit Atfal Assomoud is not necessarily known by the majority of the camp's residents.

Malaysia's sponsorship programmes for Palestinian refugees also extend to Gaza, where Malaysia's Sponsor a Palestinian Child in Gaza program was launched in 2010, receiving initial start-up funds from the Gaza Emergency Fund established by the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early 2009. MSRI was one of the NGOs appointed by the Ministry to distribute funds to support Gazan refugee children.^{xxvii} In 2012, the Malaysian Education Ministry raised RM1.7 million to build and maintain classrooms, laboratories, and other facilities in 11 schools for refugees in Jabalia, Gaza; this money was distributed to the Malaysian organization Viva Palestina Malaysia, an NGO established in 2009 supporting the self-determination of Palestine.^{xxviii}

Other Malaysian NGOs have also been prominent in the delivery of humanitarian protection to Palestinian refugees in the broader region. One such example is Aman Palestin, a Malaysian NGO established in 2004 which has primarily undertaken humanitarian activities in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. In Lebanon, Aman Palestin has held seminars on the future of the Palestinian children in Beirut, made donations to Palestinian orphanages, and introduced a sponsorship system project to support Palestinian families living in poverty.

In addition to providing support for Palestinian and Syrian refugees within Lebanon and in Gaza, Malaysia has also enabled both Syrian refugees and Palestinian refugees to travel to Malaysia through various schemes: visa-free travel and a state-sponsored 'temporary relocation programme' for Syrian refugees, and sponsorship programmes for Palestinians across Lebanon.

As recalled by a Syrian in Türkiye, Malaysia was one of two countries allowing visa-free entry for Syrians after 2016 (alongside Sudan), although they added the important caveat that "You can consider Malaysia as a free duty, not a country of asylum; Syrians can only access it with a very expensive airline ticket, in addition to the high cost of living there which Syrians will not be able to afford in general, and it is difficult to obtain work and residence permits and settle there." Such reflections continue to remind us that all responses require critical attention, rather than assuming that a given response is necessarily experienced positively as a whole.^{xxxix} Partially redressing these barriers, in October 2015 Malaysia was the first Muslim majority-country to announce that it was establishing a 'temporary relocation programme' for Syrian refugees. While eschewing the term 'refugees,' the formally-named Syrian Migrants Temporary Relocation Programme was launched to enable 3,000 Syrian refugees to travel to and relocate in Malaysia over the course of 3 years.^{xxx} This included over 100 Syrians from refugee camps in Lebanon who were flown to Malaysia, while several thousand Syrians already based in Malaysia prior to 2016 were also eventually included in this initiative,^{xxxi} providing them with accommodation and temporary residency rights within the country.

Malaysia has also facilitated the international travel of Palestinian refugees to Malaysia, primarily for educational purposes. Since 1988, the MSRI has run a Palestinian sponsorship and fostering program for Palestinian children living in refugee camps in Lebanon – including in Baddawi camp and Nahr el-Bared camp - and has also provided further assistance in the form of vocational training and medical aid.^{xxxii} Coinciding with the establishment of the Malaysian-Gifted Learning Centre in the Beit Atfal Assumoud, in 1990 Palestinian refugee children from Baddawi camp first visited Malaysia through a visit jointly-organized through the MSRI, City Hall, and the Welfare Ministry, and funded through the sponsorship of Malaysian "foster parents."^{xxxiii} In addition to facilitating these visits, the Center provides five university scholarships for Palestinian refugee students living in the camp,^{xxxiv} with many young Palestinians from across Lebanon studying within Malaysia's university system^{xxxv}; some are recipients of scholarships provided by the Malaysian government.^{xxxvi}

The provision of material assistance to refugees in their region of origin has thus been accompanied by the development of a visa-free migration policy for Syrian refugees to travel to Malaysia alongside (admittedly small-scale) transregional resettlement, fostering and educational migration programmes; this long history of support for refugees both in and from the Middle East is highly significant when understanding the role that the Malaysian state is continuing to play in Gaza in both diplomatic and humanitarian terms today.

Indonesian responses to conflict and displacement in and from Syria, Lebanon and Gaza

Indonesia's multifaceted roles in supporting IDPs and refugees in the Middle East, as in the case of Malaysia, also represents an intertwining of state and non-state led responses. As noted in the interviews cited above, Syrian and Palestinian refugees alike often identified Indonesia as having provided material assistance to internally-displaced Syrians as well as to refugees in Lebanon; the latter included the provision of "direct donations" of large quantities of food items including dates by the Indonesian state (elite interview), in addition to flexible support for locally-based organisations providing services to both Syrian and Palestinian refugees (as cited above). In turn, numerically overshadowing the role of Brazil mentioned above, Indonesia's leadership in maritime response in conflict situations also positions it as the largest provider of peacekeepers to UNIFIL, which has sought to protect civilians in the South of Lebanon since the UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1978. Of a total of 1,230 Indonesian peacekeepers – two of whom

were injured in late-2024 after “the Israeli military ‘repeatedly’ fired at UNIFIL headquarters and positions in Southern Lebanon”^{xxxvii} -, 120 are reportedly aboard the Indonesian naval vessel, KRI Diponegoro.

In terms of Indonesia’s longer-term support for Palestinian refugees across the region, including in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza, while many other states’ funding has decreased over time, Indonesia’s financial support for UNRWA has dramatically increased since 2008: from a contribution amounting to US\$10,000 that year, this increased to \$100,000 in 2012^{xxxviii} and doubled over the following decade to \$200,000 in 2022. By 2023, Indonesia was UNRWA’s 35th largest donor, having tripled its contribution in 2023 and having committed, according to the Indonesian permanent representative to the UN in July 2024, “to double what we tripled last year”.^{xxxix} That month, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed “a new commitment to increase its regular voluntary contribution to UNRWA by \$1.2 million annually,” in addition to providing a grant of \$2 million in response to the UNRWA Flash Appeal for Gaza that year (WAFA 2024). Indonesia has also committed to increasing its contribution to the ICRC.

With regards to the ongoing Israeli genocide in Gaza, by October 2024, the Indonesian state had reportedly provided aid amounting to a total of US\$4 million to Palestine, including 21 tons of aid flown to Egypt by the Indonesian air force in November 2023. In late-2023/early-2024, the Indonesian state sent a hospital ship with aid for Gaza in the hope that it would not only be able to deliver 200 tons of aid, including food, medical supplies, tents and clean water upon its arrival at the Egyptian port of Al-Arish via the Egyptian Red Crescent, but also eventually be granted permission for the ship itself to operate as a field hospital off Gaza’s coastline itself.^{xl}

In addition to the state-led provision of the hospital ship, Indonesian civil society has also been involved in founding and supporting medical infrastructure in Gaza. The Indonesian Hospital Gaza City – which was officially inaugurated by Indonesia’s then-Vice President -, was co-funded by organisations such as the Indonesian Red Cross Society as well as by Indonesian citizens and Indonesian medical charities including Indonesia’s Medical Emergency Rescue Committee (MER-C), a committee which was, in turn, established by medical students from the University of Indonesia. Three Indonesian MER-C medical humanitarian volunteers working at the Indonesian Hospital were “trapped” inside Gaza as it was hermetically sealed in October 2023; they decided not to evacuate when “the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [helped to] evacuate Indonesian citizens from Gaza”,^{xli} but instead decided to remain, to “stay inside Gaza because we need them to take care of the humanitarian work” before new medical teams could gain access.^{xlii} These medical volunteers have worked alongside Palestinian doctors who have been caring for multiply displaced Palestinians across Gaza (see Box 2), including Dr Fayez Abed who was educated in Cuba through the educational migration programme discussed above.

Box 2: Intersecting Responses: Local-International, Southern-Northern

Since 2024, local medical responders – Palestinians and non-Palestinians alike – who were already based in Gaza, have been joined by rotating medical teams as and when they have been permitted to cross the border, including members of the Palestinian diaspora, such as the British-Palestinian reconstructive surgeon Dr Ghassan Abu-Sitta, as well as volunteer doctors from countries including (in alphabetical order) Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Jordan and Pakistan.^{xliii} At risk of bombardment and at times desperately awaiting their own evacuation as hospitals have come under attack these doctors have typically been embedded within emergency medical teams which also demonstrate the intertwining of ‘Southern’ and

‘Northern’ institutions, such as Malaysian doctors working with Mercy Malaysia Emergency Medical Team under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO), and Jordanian doctors not only working for the Jordanian field hospitals but also travelling, for instance, as part of medical teams established by the International Rescue Committee and Medical Aid for Palestinians.^{xliv}

Such teams have also included medics who hold European and North American nationalities and who have high profile personas in the public sphere, having often volunteered in Gaza, the West Bank and the Palestinian refugee camps across the region over the course of several decades.^{xlv} Dozens of doctors travelling from countries of the global North to work in Gaza – such as Dr Abdo Algendy, Dr Fozia Alvi, Dr Yipeng Ge, Dr Yasser Khan, Dr Zaher Sahloul and Dr Mohammed Taher – themselves have personal and familial histories which position them as members of minoritised communities.

In turn, where possible, ‘Northern’ organisations like MSF have established clinics within still-operational hospitals born as embodiments of South–South solidarity; for instance, an MSF clinic was established within the Indonesia Hospital in Rafah in mid-December 2023,^{xlvi} illustrating the ways that Northern and Southern institutions have sought to work together to not only provide life-saving support, but also actively challenge the status quo. Given the scale of destruction, some states have sought to find ways to provide *new* clinical infrastructure, although such initiatives have continued to be blocked by the Israeli state (as noted above in the case of Indonesia’s hospital ship). As such initiatives continue to be blocked, it is clear that the aid that has been prevented by the Israeli forces from entering the Gaza Strip for months on end – in ongoing violation of the ICJ’s Interim Orders – include medical and food supplies provided by not only the UN, EU and Northern-led INGOs, but also by states such as Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Rwanda, Türkiye, Tunisia and the UAE,^{xlvii} as well as by NGOs, faith-based groups, local and transnational civil society networks and diaspora organisations established, funded and led by citizens, migrants and refugees from around the world. Indeed, where Gazan Palestinian doctors have been working *in situ* with the support of volunteer Palestinian doctors from the diaspora, it is equally the case that Palestinian refugees from camps including Baddawi camp have collected funds and supported aid drives in yet another iteration of what can variously be denominated ‘diaspora humanitarianism’ or ‘refugee-refugee humanitarianism.’^{xlviii}

Together, these responses all demonstrate the intimate intertwining of actors from across all levels, scales and geographies, including a wide range of both regional and transregional responses.

Framing the examples of Malaysia and Indonesia as *intersecting* partially redresses the apparent invisibility of these actors’ responses, increasing awareness and knowledge of the roles they have played over time and space. One of the reasons behind the relative lack of Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s visibility is precisely due to the mode of aid provision in places such as Baddawi camp: aside from a small plaque marking the establishment of the Malaysian-Gifted Learning Centre, there are few if any traces visually asserting the role of either Malaysia or Indonesia in the camp. Without logos, or public relations campaigns, the support has ultimately been provided with discretion, to the extent that only people familiar with the history of the initiatives are aware, perhaps due to their own or their relatives’ involvement as sponsored families, or through their own work through Beit Atfal Assumoud.

While the hypervisibility of donor logos has been extensively critiqued by people with displacement backgrounds, including the people interviewed as part of the SOURCED project,^{xlix} it is also worth noting the potential risks of ‘invisible’ forms of aid provision. In essence, as the roles played by states like Malaysia and Indonesia increase in a range of geographies, a lack of awareness and knowledge of their track record may mean that their interventions continue to be decontextualised and viewed as ‘new.’ As the aid landscape continues to diversify to uphold displaced peoples’ rights – both in terms of donors and forms of response – this may, in turn, have longer term implications unless further steps are taken to fill the ‘trust gap’.

Indeed, the importance of history emerged repeatedly across the project interviews with differently positioned individuals, including precisely as a means of rejecting the presentism of contemporary debates pertaining to refugee response, and the way that denominations of ‘new’ actors “places them in time” and in so doing denies the broader significance of their and other states’ work.ⁱ At other times, however, some individuals argued that the term ‘new’ was misleading as a means of denouncing the perceived decline or disappearance of these previously-active states over time. In this regard, states from across the global South were often perceived to have been more active several decades ago, while their roles had declined over time. Equally, people often lamented the flattening of the aid landscape both in terms of the range of actors and the modes of response available in the present.ⁱⁱ Nonetheless, as the Spotlights in this report demonstrate, many state and non-state actors continue to build on their past initiatives to inform and ground their transregional responses to conflict and displacement, in turn pointing to the potential of such transregional modalities of response in future.

Conclusion

Throughout this report, I have offered an inevitably partial and yet multifaceted mapping of a wide range of transregional responses to conflict and displacement as developed by states with varying levels of GDP and degrees of geopolitical power, including (in alphabetical order) Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, South Korea and Malaysia. Drawing on insights from the SOURCED research project, including interviews with people displaced from Syria, members of the communities hosting refugees, and representatives of refugee-led organisations and groups in Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye, I have highlighted the long history of transregional responses which include, but also transcend, financial or material donations for IDPs and refugees. The report has thus mapped out transregional initiatives which entail the provision of aid and services as well as support for local, refugee-led organisations through collaborative and flexible donor processes. Here, the cases of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan were pinpointed as providing important forms of refugee response in Türkiye and Jordan, and Japanese NGOs like AAR Japan were praised for their professionalism and collaborative ways of working with refugee-led organisations with minimum interference and restrictions; in turn, Malaysia and Indonesia were identified as offering discrete but sustained forms of support, including through funding refugee-led organisations, as well as providing support for educational programs and medical aid in both Lebanon and Gaza. Other modalities of transregional response, such as those offered by Brazil, Malaysia and Cuba, included providing opportunities for visa-free entry or access to humanitarian visas for people to safely leave their country or region of origin, facilitating access to *de facto* resettlement programmes and/or transregional educational migration programmes for people to seek a combination of individual, collective and national forms of self-sufficiency and self-determination. A further series of initiatives have revolved around upholding international law and promoting a commitment to legal and political protection. The leadership of South Africa and the founding members of The Hague Group in legal and diplomatic efforts to hold Israel accountable for genocidal violence in Gaza demonstrate the significance of transnational coalitions in promoting legal and political advocacy in conflict and displacement situations.

In drawing attention to these past and present modalities of transregional response, the report has thus highlighted the significance of exploring both the *quality*, and not just the *quantity*, of response, and, equally, also the importance of recognising the existence of ‘unquantifiable’ forms of response and ‘non-traditional modes of response’ that go beyond financial support and the roles of donor/host states. This is important for a number of reasons including as a means of redressing significant ‘knowledge gaps’ and ‘trust gaps’ that exist for many reasons, including because many transregional responders operate through discrete paradigms – as in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia cited above –, leading to a lack of popular awareness about their contributions in the past and present. Filling such gaps in knowledge about transregional responses is essential to offer greater recognition at all levels - amongst individuals navigating their lives in displacement; representatives in national and international organisations and agencies navigating funding cuts and institutional restructuring; as well as state and non-state actors considering how to uphold people’s rights. These initiatives highlight the potential of complementing the current drive to diversify donors and funding sources with a commitment to diversifying the *forms* of response with attention to quality, cooperation, sustainability and political advocacy, always placing the protection needs of people affected by conflict and displacement at the core.

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ⁱ In Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

ⁱⁱ In 2012 the Arab League pledged \$100m in aid to Syrian refugees (Gulf Times 2012). Between 2012 and 2023, it is estimated that Kuwait had provided \$800 million in aid, amounting to nearly one third of all aid for Syrian refugees and IDPs pledged through the UN; the UAE had offered \$364 million (Chatham House 2023). Kuwait's "role in responding to the humanitarian needs of Syria" was publicly heralded by the then-UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, who described the Gulf state as a 'global humanitarian centre' (Elkahlout 2020:145; El Marzouki et al. 2019).

ⁱⁱⁱ See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

^{iv} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

^v See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

^{vi} In Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

^{vii} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2019).

^{viii} See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025).

^{ix} See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

^x As explored, for instance, by Abdenur (2016b), Abdenur and Sochaczewski (2016), Espinoza (2018a/b) and Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025).

^{xi} Abdenur and Sochaczewski (2016: 88).

^{xii} Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025); see www.conectas.org/en/noticias/brazil-approves-less-2-refugee-applications-2017/ (accessed 10 December 2024).

^{xiii} Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025).

^{xiv} Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025).

^{xv} On the resettlement of Syrian and Palestinian refugees to Brazil see Espinoza (2018a/b); on Syrian refugees' conceptualisations of the resettlement programme to Brazil, see Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025). More broadly, on Brazil's role in responses to the Syrian conflict see Abdenur and Sochaczewski (2016) and Abdenur (2016b).

^{xvi} Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025).

^{xvii} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2010, 2015a).

^{xviii} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2010, 2015a).

^{xix} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2010, 2015a).

^{xx} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015a, 2018).

^{xxi} Prensa Latina (2023).

^{xxii} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

^{xxiii} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

^{xxiv} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025c).

^{xxv} An earlier version of this section of the report was previously published in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025b).

^{xxvi} See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015), Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley (2018), Rao (2024).

^{xxvii} MRSI (2010a/b).

^{xxviii} New Straits Times (2012).

- ^{xxix} Indeed, further research is needed to examine Syrian and Palestinian refugees' experiences of these countries' transregional responses, as they have been developed in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza, as well in Southeast Asia itself. See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).
- ^{xxx} BBC (2015).
- ^{xxxi} Abd Jalil and Hoffstaedter (2024).
- ^{xxxii} MSRI (2010a).
- ^{xxxiii} New Straits Times (1990).
- ^{xxxiv} MRSI (2010b).
- ^{xxxv} Pandian (2008).
- ^{xxxvi} The Choice (2012).
- ^{xxxvii} Al Jazeera (2024).
- ^{xxxviii} See <https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/press-releases/indonesia-pledges-100000-palestine-refugees>
- ^{xxxix} Shofa (2024).
- ^{xl} VOA News (2024), Malufti (2024).
- ^{xli} Llewellyn (2023).
- ^{xlii} People's Health Dispatch (2023).
- ^{xliii} See The Palestinian Information Centre (2024), Al Amir (2024), New Straits Times (2024a, 2024b) and Rédaction Africanews (2024).
- ^{xliv} Rédaction Africanews (2024), Elayyan (2024)
- ^{xl} Haj-Hassan *et al.* (2014), Algendy (2024) and Kossaify (2024).
- ^{xlvi} MSF (2024)
- ^{xlvi} Al Jazeera (2023), Reuters (2024).
- ^{xlvi} Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2020b).
- ^{xl} While they hypervisibility of donor logos has been extensively critiqued by people with displacement backgrounds, including the people interviewed as part of the SOURCED project, it is also worth noting the potential risks of 'invisible' forms of aid provision (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2025a).
- ⁱ International practitioner cited in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).
- ^{li} See Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2025a).

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